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Abstract. We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to
perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform
the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative
simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents
to participate in the task (to vote in favor of a decision). We take the linear threshold model as the
influence model. We show first the expressiveness of influence games showing that they capture the
class of simple games. Then we characterize the computational complexity of various problems on
influence games, including measures (length and width), values (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) and
properties (of teams and players). Finally, we analyze those problems for some particular extremal
cases, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing tighter complexity characterizations.
Keywords: Spread of influence, Simple games, Influence games, Computational complexity
1 Introduction
Cooperation towards task execution when tasks cannot be performed by a single agent is one of the
fundamental problems in both social and multiagent systems. There has been a lot of research under-
standing collective tasks allocation under different models coming from cooperative game theory. Under
such framework, in general, cooperation is achieved by splitting the agents into teams so that each team
performs a particular task and the pay-off of the team is split among the team members. Thus, cooper-
ative game theory provides the fundamental tools to analyze this context. Among the many references
we refer the reader to [55,56,13,43,6,15].
The ways in which people influence each other through their interactions in a social network has
received a lot of attention in the last decade. Social networks have become a huge interdisciplinary
research area with important links to sociology, economics, epidemiology, computer science, and math-
ematics [37,19,2,34] (players face the choice of adopting a specific product or not; users choose among
competing programs from providers of mobile telephones, having the option to adopt more than one
product at an extra cost; etc.). A social network can be represented by a graph where each node is an
agent and each edge represents the degree of influence of one agent over another one. Several “germs”
(ideas, trends, fashions, ambitions, rules, etc.) can be initiated by one or more agents and eventually
be adopted by the system. The mechanism defining how these motivations are propagated within the
network, from the influence of a small set of initially motivated nodes, is called a model for influence
spread.
Motivated by viral marketing and other applications the problem that has been usually studied is
the influence maximization problem initially introduced by Domingos and Richardson [18,49] and further
developed in [39,21]. This problem addresses the question of finding a set with at most k players having
maximum influence, and it is NP-hard [18], unless additional restrictions are considered, in which case
some generality of the problem is lost [49]. Two general models for spread of influence were defined in [39]:
the linear threshold model, based in the first ideas of [33,51], and the independent cascade model, created
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in the context of marketing by [31,32]. Models for influence spread in the presence of multiple competing
products has also been proposed and analyzed [9,12,2]. In such a setting there is also work done towards
analyzing the problem from the point of view of non-cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative influence
games were defined in 2011 by Irfan and Ortiz [36]. Those games, however, analyze the strategic aspects
of two firms competing on the social network and differ from our proposal.
We propose to analyze cooperation in multiagent systems based on a model for influence among
the agents in their established network of trust and influence. Social influence is relevant to determine
the global behavior of a social network and thus it can be used to enforce cooperation by targeting an
adequate initial set of agents. From this point of view we consider a simple and altruistic multiagent
system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends
on the perception of the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model the scenario
by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team of players (or coalition) succeeds if it
is able to convince enough number of agents to participate in the task. We take the deterministic linear
threshold model [14,2] as the mechanism for influence spread in the subjacent social network.
In the considered scenario we adopt the natural point of view of decision or voting systems, mathe-
matically modeled as simple games [54]. Simple games were firstly introduced in 1944 by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [54] as a fundamental model for social choice. This point of view brings into the analysis
several parameters and properties that play a relevant role in the study of simple games and thus in the
analysis of the proposed scenario. Among those we consider the length and the width, two fundamental
parameters that are indicators of efficiency for making a decision [48], or the Shapley-Shubik value (SS-
val) and the Banzhaf value (Bval) that provide a measure of the notion of individual influence. The
properties defining proper, strong and decisive games have been considered in the context of simple game
theory from its origins [53] and they are also studied. Besides those properties we also consider equiv-
alence and isomorphism. Together with properties of the games there are several properties associated
to players that are of interest. Among others we consider the critical players which were used at least
since 1965 by Banzhaf [7]. We refer the reader to [53] for a more complete motivation in a viewpoint
of simple games and to [5,13] for computational aspects of simple games and in general of cooperative
game theory.
To define an influence game we take the spread of influence, in the linear threshold model, as the
value that measures the power of a team. An influence game is described by an influence graph, modeling
a social network, and a quota, indicating the required minimum number of agents that have to cooperate
to perform successfully the task. Therefore, a team will be successful or winning if it can influence at
least as many individuals as the quota establishes. Such an approach reveals the importance of the
influence between some players over others in order to form successful teams. In this first analysis, we
draw upon the deterministic version of the linear threshold model, in which node thresholds are fixed,
as our model for influence spread following [14,2]. It will be of interest to analyze influence games under
other spreading models, in particular in the linear threshold model with random thresholds.
Our first result concerns the expressiveness of the family of influence games. We show that unweighted
influence games capture the complete family of simple games. Although the construction can be com-
puted in polynomial time when the simple game is given in extensive winning or minimal winning form,
the number of winning or minimal winning coalitions is, in general, exponential in the number of players.
Interestingly enough the formalization as weighted influence games allows a polynomial time implemen-
tation of the operations of intersection and union of weighted simple games, thus showing that, in several
cases, simple games that do not admit a succinct representation as weighted games can be represented
succinctly as influence games, because its (co)dimension is small. In our characterization we make use of
a parameter, the minimum size k for which all coalitions with k members are winning, that turns out to
be useful to show that the width of a simple game given in extensive winning or minimal winning form
can be computed in polynomial time. This settles an open problem from [5].
Our second set of results settles the complexity of the problems related to parameters and properties.
Hardness results are obtained for unweighted influence games in which the number of agents in the
network is polynomial in the number of players, while polynomial time algorithms are devised for general
influence games. The new results are summarized in Table 1 as well as the known ones.
We refer the reader to Sections 2 and 4 for a formal definition of all the representations mentioned
in the first row and the problems in the first column of Table 1. There P (polynomial time solvable),
#PC (#P-complete), NPH (NP-hard), coNPH (coNP-hard), coNPC (coNP-complete), QP (quasi-
polynomial time solvable) and gIso (the class of problems reducible to graph isomorphism) are known
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Extensive Minimal Weighted Multiple Influence
winning winning Games weighted games
(N,W) (N,Wm) [q;w1, . . . , wn] games (G,w, f, q, N)
Length P P P[5] NPH[5] NPH
Width P P P[5] P[5] NPH
Bval P[4] #PC[4] #PC[16] #PC #PC
SSval P[4] #PC[4] #PC[42] #PC #PC
IsDummy P P coNPC[42] coNPC[42] coNPC
IsPasser P[4] P[4] P[4] P[4] P
IsVetoer P[4] P[4] P[4] P[4] P
IsDictator P[4] P[4] P[4] P[4] P
AreSymmetric P P coNPC[42] coNPC[42] P
IsCritical P P P P P
IsBlocking P P P P P
IsProper P P coNPC[27] coNPC coNPC
IsStrong P coNPC[47] coNPC[27] coNPC coNPC
IsDecisive P QP[23] coNPC[5] coNPC coNPC
Equiv P P coNPC[20] coNPH[20] coNPH
Iso gIso gIso ? ? coNPH
Table 1. Summary of new results (in bold face), known results and trivial results (without reference).
computational complexity classes [29,44]. The isomorphism problems for simple games, given either by
(N,W) or (N,Wm), is easily shown to be polynomially reducible to the graph isomorphism problem.
For games given by (N,Wm), the Iso problem and the graph isomorphism problem are equivalent using
arguments from [41].
Finally, we consider two extreme cases of influence spread in social networks for undirected and
unweighted influence games. In a maximum influence requirement, agents adopt a behavior only when all
its peers have already adopted it. This is opposed to a minimum influence requirement in which an agent
gets convinced when at least one of its peers does. We show that, in both cases, the problems IsProper,
IsStrong and IsDecisive, as well as computing Width, have polynomial time algorithms. Computing
Length is NP-hard for maximum influence and polynomial time solvable for minimum influence.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
Before introducing formally the family of influence games we need to define a family of labeled graphs
and a process of spread of influence based on the linear threshold model [33,51]. We use standard graph
notation following [10]. As usual, given a finite set U , P(U) denotes its power set, and |U | its cardinality.
For any 0 ≤ k ≤ |U |, Pk(U) denotes the subsets of U with exactly k-elements. For a given graph
G = (V,E) we assume that n = |V | and m = |E|. Also G[S] denotes the subgraph induced by S ⊆ V .
Definition 1. An influence graph is a tuple (G,w, f), where G = (V,E) is a weighted, labeled and
directed graph (without loops). As usual V is the set of vertices or agents, E is the set of edges and
w : E → N is a weight function. Finally, f : V → N is a labeling function that quantifies how influenceable
each agent is. An agent i ∈ V has influence over another j ∈ V if and only if (i, j) ∈ E. We also consider
the family of unweighted influence graphs (G, f) in which every edge has weight 1.
Given an influence graph (G,w, f) and an initial activation set X ⊆ V , the spread of influence of X
is the set F (X) ⊆ V which is formed by the agents activated through an iterative process. We use Fk(X)
to denote the set of nodes activated at step k. Initially, at step 0, only the vertices in X are activated,
that is F0(X) = X . At step i > 0, those vertices for which the sum of weights of the edges connecting
nodes in Fi−1(X) to them meets or exceeds their label functions are activated, i.e.,
Fi(X) = Fi−1(X) ∪ {v ∈ V |
∑
{u∈Fi−1(X)|(u,v)∈E}
w((u, v)) ≥ f(v)}.
The process stops when no additional activation occurs and the final set of activated nodes becomes
F (X).
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F0(X) = X = {a}.
1a 1 b
1c 2 d
F1(X) = {a, c}.
1a 1 b
1c 2 d
F (X) = F2(X) = {a, c, d}.
1a 1 b
1c 2 d
Fig. 1. The spread of influence starting from the initial activation of X = {a} on an unweighted graph.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows the spread of influence F (X) in an unweighted influence graph G = (V, f),
with V = {a, b, c, d}, for the initial activation X = {a}. In the first step we obtain F1(X) = {a, c}, and
in the second step (the last one) we obtain F (X) = F2(x) = {a, c, d}.
As the number of vertices is finite, for any i > n, Fi(X) = Fi−1(X). Thus, F (X) = Fn(X) and we
have the following well known basic result.
Lemma 1. Given an influence graph (G,w, f) and a set of vertices X, the set F (X) can be computed
in polynomial time.
In what follows, unless otherwise stated, results and definitions will be stated for directed graphs. All
of them can be restated for undirected graphs. Now we define influence games.
Definition 2. An influence game is given by a tuple (G,w, f, q,N) where (G,w, f) is an influence graph,
q is an integer quota, 0 ≤ q ≤ |V | + 1, and N ⊆ V is the set of players. X ⊆ N is a successful team if
and only if |F (X)| ≥ q, otherwise X is an unsuccessful team.
As it was done for influence graphs, we also consider the family of unweighted influence games for
the cases in which the graph G is unweighted. In such a case we use the notation (G, f, q,N).
An influence game adopts a correspondence with a mathematical model called simple game, where
teams are coalitions, and some agents act as players. Simple games were firstly introduced in 1944 by
Neumann and Morgenstern [54], but using the definition that corresponds to the so called strong games,
which will be defined later. The first definition as we understand simple games was given in 1953 by
Gillies [30]. In this scenario of simple games, we follow definitions and notation from [53]. A family of
subsets W ⊆ P(N) is said monotonic when, for any X ∈ W and Z ∈ P(N), if X ⊆ Z , then Z ∈ W .
Definition 3. A simple game Γ is given by a tuple (N,W) where N is a finite set of players and W is
a monotonic family of subsets of N formed by the winning coalitions (successful teams).
In the context of simple games, the subsets of N are called coalitions, N is the grand coalition and
X ∈ W is a winning coalition. Any subset of N which is not a winning coalition is called a losing
coalition (an unsuccessful team). A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition X that does not
properly contain any winning coalition. That is, removing any player from X results in a losing coalition.
A maximal losing coalition is a losing coalition X that is not properly contained in any other losing
coalition. That is, adding any player to X results in a winning coalition. We use W , L, Wm and LM to
denote the sets of winning, losing, minimal winning and maximal losing coalitions, respectively. Any of
those set families determine uniquely the game and constitute the usual forms of representation for simple
games [53], although the size of those representations are not, in general, polynomial in the number of
players.
Example 2. Let (G, f) be an influence graph and N any subset of agents. Two particular ranges of the
quota lead to some trivial simple games. By setting q = 0, thus considering influence games of the form
(G, f, 0, N), we have that every team of agents is successful, therefore (G, f, 0, N) is a representation of
the simple game (N,P(N)). When q > |V (G)|, the influence game (G, f, q,N) is a representation of the
simple game (N, ∅) as there are no successful teams in the game.
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Let us provide an example of influence game based on the influence graph considered in Example 1.
Example 3. Consider the influence game Γ = (G, f, 3, V (G)), where (G, f) is the influence graph consid-
ered in Example 1. In this case, we have that, F ({a}) = {a, c, d}, and thus {a} ∈ W . The fundamental
set families for Γ are:
Wm = {{a}, {b}} LM = {{c, d}} L = {{c, d}, {c}, {d}, {}} W = P(V (G)) \ L.
The intersection of two simple games is the simple game where a coalition wins if and only if it wins
in both games. In a similar way, the union of two simple games is the simple game where a coalition
wins if and only if it wins in at least one of the two games [53].
Finally, we introduce a subfamily of simple games, the weighted games.
Definition 4. A simple game (N,W) is a weighted game (also called weighted voting game) if there
exists a weight function w : N → R+ and a quota q ∈ R, such that, for any X ⊆ N , X ∈ W if and only
if w(X) ≥ q, where w(X) =
∑
i∈X w(i).
A weighted game can be represented by a weighted representation, i.e., a vector [q;w1, . . . , wn] where
wi = w(i), for any i ∈ N , and q ∈ R is a quota, defining the simple game in which S ∈ W if and only if
w(S) ≥ q. According to Hu [35] (see also [26]) the weighted representations can be restricted to integer
non-negative weights with 0 ≤ q ≤ w(N). Multiple weighted games are simple games defined by the
intersection of a finite collection of weighted games.
Despite the fact that weighted games are a strict subclass of simple games, it is known that every
simple game can be expressed as an intersection or an union of a finite number of weighted games. The
result for intersection (dimension concept) was firstly shown in [38] for hypergraphs, and then expressed
for simple games in [52]. The result for union (codimension concept) was introduced for simple games
in [25]. A simple game is said to be of dimension (codimension) k if and only if it can be represented
as the intersection (union) of exactly k weighted games, but not as the intersection (union) of (k − 1)
weighted games. It is known that given k weighted games, to decide whether the dimension of their
intersection exactly equals k is NP-hard [17]. A generalization of games constructed through binary
operators is the family of boolean weighted games introduced in [22]. A boolean weighted game is defined
by a propositional logic formula and a finite collection of weighted games. The boolean formula determines
the requirements for a coalition to be winning in the described game. When considering only monotone
formulas, boolean weighted games provide another representation of simple games.
3 Expressiveness
Influence games are monotonic as, for any X ⊆ N and i ∈ N , if |F (X)| ≥ q then |F (X ∪{i})| ≥ q, and if
|F (X)| < q then |F (X\{i})| < q. Thus, every influence game is a simple game. Moreover, we will show
that the opposite is also true. Before stating the main theorem we need the definition of a new measure
over simple games.
Definition 5. The strict length of a simple game Γ is sLength(Γ ) = min{k ∈ N | Pk(N) ⊆ W}.
The measure sLength will be considered later in Section 4 together with other measures for simple
games.
Theorem 1. Every simple game can be represented by an unweighted influence game. Furthermore, when
the simple game Γ is given by either (N,W) or (N,Wm), an unweighted influence game representing Γ
can be obtained in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that a simple game Γ is given by (N,W) or (N,Wm). It is already well known that given
(N,W), the family Wm can be obtained in polynomial time. Thus we assume in the following that the
set of players and the set Wm are given.
In order to represent Γ as an influence game we first define an unweighted influence graph (G, f). The
graph G = (V,E) is the following. The set V of nodes is formed by a set with n nodes, VN = {v1, . . . , vn},
one for each player, and a set of nodes for each minimal winning coalition. For any X ∈ Wm, we add a
new set VX with sLength(Γ ) − |X | nodes. We connect vertex vi with all the vertices in VX whenever
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11
1
2
1
3
1
4
2 2
Fig. 2. An unweighted influence graph associated to the simple game ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {{1, 2, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}).
1 . . . 1
q
w1 wn
n nodes
n nodes1 . . . 1
1 1
Fig. 3. An influence graph (G,w, f) associated to the weighted game [q;w1, . . . , wn].
i ∈ X . Finally, the label function is defined as follows, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, f(vi) = 1 and, for any X ∈ Wm
and any v ∈ VX , f(v) = |X |. Observe that in the influence game (G, f, sLength(Γ ), VN ) a team is
successful if and only if its players form a winning coalition in Γ . Therefore (G, f, sLength(Γ ), VN ) is a
representation of Γ as unweighted influence game.
It remains to show that given (N,Wm) a description of (G, f, sLength(Γ ), N) can be computed in
polynomial time. For doing so it is enough to show that sLength(Γ ) can be computed in polynomial
time. Let k = sLength(Γ ).
Observe that, by definition, all the coalitions with k players are winning in Γ but at least one coalition
with size k − 1 is losing. Therefore there is a minimal winning coalition with size k and there are no
minimal winning coalitions with size k+1. Thus, computing k is equivalent to compute the maximum size
of a minimal winning coalition. The last quantity can be obtained in polynomial time from a description
of Wm.
The following example provides an illustration of the construction.
Example 4. Let Γ = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {{1, 2, 4}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}) be a simple game in minimal winning form.
We have that sLength(Γ ) = 3 because all subsets of N with cardinality 3 are winning, i.e., we have that
the family {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4} ∈ W . For coalition {1, 2, 4} we do not need to add nodes
to the graph. For each of the teams {2, 3} and {3, 4}, we need to add one node with label 3− 2 = 1. A
drawing of the resulting unweighted influence graph is given in Figure 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 shows the expressiveness of the family of influence games with respect to
the class of simple games. However, the construction cannot be implemented in polynomial time when
the simple game is given in succinct way, as for instance by a weighted representation or as a monotonic
Boolean function. Observe also that the number of agents in the corresponding influence game is in general
exponential in the number of players. For the particular case of weighted games, with given weighted
representation, we can show that there exist representations by influence games having a polynomial
number of agents.
Theorem 2. Every weighted game can be represented as an influence game. Furthermore, given a
weighted representation of the game, a representation as an influence game can be obtained in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted game, consider the influence game (G,w, f, n + 1, N), whose
influence graph is shown in Figure 3. The n nodes in the first level of G correspond to the set N , each
of them has as associated label the value 1. Each node i ∈ N is connected to a central node with label
q and the corresponding edge has weight wi. The n nodes in the last level are another set of n nodes
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1 . . . 1 . . . 1
1
w1
. . .
1 1
wi
. . .
1 1
wn
. . .
1
q
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . 1
n nodes
n∑
i=1
wi nodes
n+
n∑
i=1
wi nodes
Fig. 4. An unweighted influence graph (G, f) associated to the weighted game [q;w1, . . . , wn].
with label 1. Observe that, X ⊆ N is a winning coalition in [q;w1, . . . , wn] if and only if
∑
i∈X wi ≥ q.
The last condition is equivalent to |F (X)| ≥ n + 1.Thus we have that X ⊆ N is a winning coalition in
[q;w1, . . . , wn] if and only if X ⊆ N is a winning coalition in (G,w, f, n+ 1, N).
Finally, observe that the construction of (G,w, f, n + 1, N) can be done in polynomial time with
respect to the size of [q;w1, . . . , wn].
Observe that in the previous construction the size of the influence graph is polynomial in the number of
agents but the overall construction is done in polynomial time in the size of the weighted representation.
We can change slightly the construction and get a representation as unweighted influence game by
increasing again the proportion of players.
Theorem 3. Every weighted game can be represented as an unweighted influence game. Furthermore,
given a weighted representation of the game, a representation as unweighted influence game can be ob-
tained in pseudo-polynomial time.
Proof. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted game, consider the unweighted influence graph (G, f) sketched
in Figure 4. The n nodes in the first level correspond to the set N . For any i ∈ N , node i is connected to
a set of wi different nodes in the second level representing its weight. Thus, X ⊆ N is a winning coalition
if and only if
∑
i∈X wi ≥ q, which is equivalent to |F (X)| ≥ n+
∑n
i=1 wi. Therefore, the influence game
(G, f, n+
∑n
i=1 wi, N) is a representation of the given weighted game.
Observe that given [q;w1, . . . , wn], constructing the graph G requires time O(n+w1 + · · ·+wn) and
thus the construction can be done in pseudo-polynomial time.
In the previous results we have assumed that a weighted representation of the game is given. It is
known that there are weighted games whose weighted representation requires that maxi∈N{wi} to be
(n + 1)(n+1)/2/2 [45]. Therefore the construction of the previous lemma will require exponential space
and time with respect to the number of players.
Our next result establishes the closure of influence games under intersection and union. Furthermore,
we show that an influence game representing the resulting simple game can be obtained in polynomial
time.
Theorem 4. Given two influence games, their intersection and union can be represented as an influence
game. Furthermore, both constructions can be obtained in polynomial time.
Proof. Let Γ = (G,w, f, q,N) be an influence game with G = (V,E), recall that, for any X ⊆ N ,
Fi(X) ⊆ V denotes the spread of influence of X in the i-th step of the activation process and that we
can assume that 0 ≤ i ≤ n. All the sets considered in our constructions are replications of either the set
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F 0 f
1
F 1 f
2
F 2 f
n
Fn
1v1
...
1vn
f(v1)
...
f(vn)
1
...
1
f(v1)
...
f(vn)
1
...
1
. . .
. . .
. . .
f(v1)
...
f(vn)
1
...
1
Fig. 5. The influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) associated to the influence game (G,w, f, q, N).
F
1
...N
1
F 01 F
n
1
F 02 F
n
2
(G′1, w
′
1, f
′
1)
(G′2, w
′
2, f
′
2)
q1
q2
x
1 s1
...
1 s4n2+3n+2
Fig. 6. The influence graph associated to the intersection (x = 2) or the union (x = 1) of two influence games
with influence graphs (G1, w1, f1) and (G2, w2, f2) and quotas q1 and q2 respectively.
N or the set V . For sake of simplicity, we use the term corresponding node to refer to the same node in
a different copy of N or V .
We start constructing an influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) as shown in Figure 5. G′ has 2n+ 1 columns of
nodes. The first column F 0 represents V , and the remaining nodes are divided in pairs of sets (f i, F i),
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the sets f i and F i have n nodes each, as a replication of the nodes
in V . The edges are defined as follows, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a node y ∈ F i−1 is connected to a node z ∈ f i
if and only if (y, z) ∈ E. These edges have associated weight w((y, z)). Furthermore, every node in F i−1
is connected by an edge with weight 1 to its corresponding node in F i. Every node in f i is connected by
an edge with weight 1 to its corresponding node in F i. The labeling function assigns label 1 to all the
nodes in sets F i and maintains the original labeling for nodes in the sets f i.
Note that after the activation of a team X ⊆ F 0 in (G′, w′, f ′), for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the set of nodes in
F i that are activated coincides with the set Fi(X). Thus the subset of activated nodes in F
n coincides
with F (X). Observe also that (G′, w′, f ′) has 2n2+n nodes and that it can be constructed in polynomial
time in the size of a given influence game (G,w, f, q,N).
Now, given two influence games Γ1 = (G1, w1, f1, q1, N) and Γ2 = (G2, w2, f2, q2, N) we construct
the two influence graphs (G′1, w
′
1, f
′
1) and (G
′
2, w
′
2, f
′
2) as described before (see Figure 5). We use the
construction depicted in Figure 6 to construct another influence graph. In this last construction we add
a set F which is a copy of N . All the nodes in F have label 1. The nodes in F are connected to their
corresponding nodes in F 01 and in F
0
2 through edges with weight 1. Furthermore, we add a node with
label q1, a node with label q2, a node with label x, and a set with 4n
2+3n+2 nodes. Those new nodes are
connected according to the pattern given in Figure 6. The nodes in the last column, Fni , of (G
′
i, w
′
i, f
′
i)
are all connected to the node with label qi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. The nodes with labels q1 and q2 are connected
to the node with label x which is connected to the last set of nodes. All those new connections have
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Fig. 7. Influence graphs associated to [q1;w
1
1 , . . . , w
1
n] ∩ [q2;w
2
1 , . . . , w
2
n] (x = 2), and [q1;w
1
1 , . . . , w
1
n] ∪
[q2;w
2
1 , . . . , w
2
n] (x = 1).
assigned weight 1. Observe that in total we have at most 2(2n2 + n) + n+ 3+ 4n2 +3n+2 nodes. Thus
the overall construction can be computed in polynomial time.
Let (G∪, w∪, f∪) be the influence graph obtained by setting x = 1 and (G∩, w∩, f∩) be the influence
graph obtained by setting x = 2. Consider the games Γ∪ = (G∪, w∪, f∪, 4n
2 + 3n + 2, F ) and Γ∩ =
(G∩, w∩, f∩, 4n
2 + 3n+ 2, F ). By construction a team X is successful in Γ∪ if and only if X is succesful
in either Γ1 or Γ2. Further, a team is successful in Γ∩ if and only if X is succesful in both Γ1 and Γ2.
It is interesting to note that it is possible to devise a construction representing the intersection or
the union of weighted games as the influence games (G′∪, w
′, f ′∪, n+2, N) and (G
′
∩, w
′, f ′∩, n+3, N). The
corresponding influence graphs (G′∪, w
′, f ′∪) and (G
′
∩, w
′, f ′∩) are shown in Figure 7 (setting as before
label x to be 1 or 2 depending on the considered operation). This new construction requires only a linear
number of additional nodes, however the graph is weighted.
Thus, as any simple game can be represented as the intersection or union of a finite number of
weighted games, we have an alternative way to show the completeness of the family of weighted influence
games with respect to the class of simple games (Theorem 1). However, as the dimension, the codimen-
sion, and the representation as boolean weighted game of a simple game might be exponential in the
number of players (but bounded by the number of maximal losing, minimal winning coalitions, or both,
respectively) [28,25,22], we cannot conclude that any simple game can be represented by a weighted
influence game whose number of agents is polynomial in the number of players. For the particular case
of unweighted influence game we know the following.
Theorem 5. The family of unweighted influence games in which the number of agents in the corre-
sponding influence graph is polynomial in the number of players is a proper subset of simple games.
Proof. We use a simple counting argument to show the result. Observe that, for any n ≥ 0, there are
more than 2(2
n/n) simple games with n players [40]. Taking into account that a simple game has at most
n! isomorphic simple games we know that there are more that 2(2
n/n)/n! different simple games on n
players.
Consider an unweighted influence game with n players and f(n) agents. The possibilities for the edge
sets are less than 2(f(n)+1)
2
. It suffices to consider label functions assigning values between 0 and f(n)+1.
Thus, there are at most (f(n) + 2)f(n)+2 possibilities for the labeling functions. Finally, for the quota,
only f(n) + 2 possibilities have to be considered. Thus, the number of unweighted influence games with
n players and f(n) agents is at most 2O(f(n)
2).
Taking f(n) = nlogn, the family includes all unweighted influence games with n players and polyno-
mial number of agents. Taking the logarithm on both sides, one easily sees that 2O(f(n)
2) is asymptotically
smaller than 2(2
n/n)/n!.
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4 Parameters and Properties
From Theorems 1 and 2 we know that all the computational problems related to properties and param-
eters that are computationally hard for simple games in winning or minimal winning form, as well as for
weighted games, are also computationally hard for influence games. Nevertheless, the hardness results do
not apply to unweighted influence games with polynomial, in the number of players, number of agents. In
this section we address the computational complexity of problems for games with a polynomial number
of agents. All the hardness proofs are given for the subclass formed by unweighted influence games on
undirected influence graphs, which is a subset of all the other variations. The polynomial time algorithms
are devised for the biggest class of general influence games, i.e., weighted influence games on directed
graphs which includes all others.
Before starting to analyze problems we state here some basic results. From Lemma 1 we know that,
for a given team X , we can compute in polynomial time the set F (X). Therefore we have the following.
Lemma 2. For a given influence game (G,w, f, q,N), deciding whether a team X ⊆ N is successful can
be done in polynomial time.
Our next result concerns a particular type of influence games that we will use first as a basic construc-
tion, which associates an unweighted influence game to an undirected graph, and later as a representative
of a particular subclass of influence games.
Definition 6. Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), the unweighted influence game Γ (G) is the game
(G, f, |V |, V ) where, for any v ∈ V , the label f(v) is the degree of v in G, i.e., f(v) = dG(v).
Recall that a set S ⊆ V is a vertex cover of a graph G if and only if, for any edge (u, v) ∈ E, u or v (or
both) belong to S. From the definitions we get the following result.
Lemma 3. Let G be an undirected graph. A team X is successful in Γ (G) if and only if X is a vertex
cover of G, Furthermore, the influence game Γ (G) can be obtained in polynomial time, given a description
of G.
Table 1 in Section 1 summarizes the known computational complexity results (notation from [29])
over parameters and properties [16,23,42,46,5,27,50]. For the hardness results we provide polynomial
time reductions from the following problems (decision or optimization versions) which are known to be
NP-hard [29].
Vertex Cover: Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and an integer k.
Does G have a vertex cover with size k or less?
Set Cover: Given a finite set S, a collection of subsets C ⊆ S, and an integer k.
Is there a subset C′ ⊆ C with |C′| ≤ k such that
every element in S belongs to at least one member of C′?
Set Packing: Given a collection C of finite sets, and an integer k.
Is there a collection of disjoint sets C′ ⊆ C with |C′| ≥ k?
We first analyze the complexity of two relevant simple game measures that provide information about
the size of the teams to succeed or not. Further, we consider two new measures which are relevant for
influence games: the strict length, defined in Section 3, and its dual, the strict width. Assume that a
simple game Γ is given.
Length: The minimum size of a successful team, i.e., min {|X | | X ∈ W}.
Width: The maximum size of an unsuccessful team, i.e., max {|X | | X ∈ L}.
sLength: The minimum cardinality from which all teams are successful,
i.e., min {k ∈ N | Pk(N) ⊆ W}.
sWidth: The maximum cardinality to which all teams are unseccessful,
i.e., max {k ∈ N | Pk(N) ⊆ L}.
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Observe that for every simple game Γ , we have thatWidth(Γ ) = sLength(Γ )−1 and Length(Γ ) =
sWidth(Γ ) + 1. As we have shown in Theorem 1, sLength(Γ ) can be computed in polynomial time
when the game is given by (N,W) or (N,Wm). Our next result shows that computing all the above
measures is hard for influence games.
Theorem 6. Computing Length, Width, sLength and sWidth of an unweighted influence game is
NP-hard.
Proof. For the measure Length, we provide a reduction from the minimum set cover problem. Let
C = {C1, . . . , Cm} be a collection of subsets of a universe with n elements. We associate to C the
unweighted influence game (G, f, q,N) where G = (V,E). The graph G has three disjoint sets of vertices:
Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, T = {t1, . . . , tn}, and Z = {z1, . . . , zm+1}, together with an additional vertex x. The
components of the game are the following.
– V = Y ∪ T ∪ {x} ∪ Z,
– E = {(yj, ti) | i ∈ Cj} ∪ {(ti, x) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {(x, zk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ 1},
– f(yj) = n+ 1, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
– f(ti) = 1, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
– f(zk) = 1, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m+ 1,
– f(x) = n,
– q = m+ n+ 1 and
– N = Y .
Therefore, it is easy to see that a team X ⊆ N succeeds if and only if it corresponds to a set cover, so
the Length of (G, f, q,N) coincides with the size of a minimum set cover.
For the measureWidth we provide a reduction from the maximum set packing problem. Consider an
influence game (G′, f ′, q′, N) where G′ is constructed from G. We remove node {x}, add the connections
{(ti, zk) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1}, and set f ′(ti) = 2 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We keep N = Y and
set q′ = m + 1. It is easy to see that a team X ⊆ N is unsuccessful in (G′, f ′, q′, N) if and only if X
corresponds to a set packing in C. Therefore, the Width of (G′, f ′, q′, N) is the size of a maximum set
packing of C.
The remaining results for sLength and sWidth follow from Width(Γ ) = sLength(Γ ) − 1 and
Length(Γ ) = sWidth(Γ ) + 1.
The hardness result for Length can be obtained directly from Lemma 3. There we provide a re-
duction from the minimum vertex cover problem. However, the reduction from the minimum set cover
problem given in the previous theorem allows us to extract additional results about the complexity of
approximation. In particular, the reductions in Theorem 6 imply that Length is neither approximable
within (1 − ǫ) · logm nor within c · logn, for some c > 0, and that Width is not approximable within
m1/2−ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, using the non-approximability results from [3] for the problems minimum set cover
and minimum set packing.
When the simple game is given by (N,W) or (N,Wm), Length can trivially be computed in poly-
nomial time. As Length(Γ ) = sWidth(Γ ) + 1, sWidth can also be computed in polynomial time.
Computing Width for simple games given by (N,W) or (N,Wm) was posted as open problem in [5].
However, from Theorem 1 and taking into account that Width(Γ ) = sLength(Γ ) − 1 we have that
Width can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. Given a simple game by (N,W) or (N,Wm), Length, Width, sLength and sWidth
can be computed in polynomial time.
Our next result settles the complexity of the computation of the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik values
of a given player.
Definition 7 ([24]). Let Γ = (N,W) be a simple (influence) game. For any i ∈ N , let Ci = {S ∈
W ;S\{i} /∈ W} be the set of blocking teams (coalitions) for player i. The Banzhaf value of i on Γ is
ηi(Γ ) = |Ci| and the Shapley-Shubik value of i on Γ is
κi(Γ ) =
∑
S∈Ci
(|S| − 1)! (n− |S|)!
The Banzhaf index of i on Γ is ηi(Γ )/2
n−1 and the Shapley-Shubik index of i on Γ is κi(Γ )/n!.
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The computational complexity of the two indices is the same as that of the corresponding value. We
analyze here only the problems of computing the values. The two problems are denoted as Bval and
SSval, respectively.
Theorem 8. Computing Bval and SSval for a given influence game and a given player is #P-
complete.
Proof. Both problems belong trivially to #P. To show hardness we construct a reduction for the problem
of computing the number of vertex covers of a given graph which is known to be #P-complete [29]. Let
G be a graph, we first construct the graph G′ which is obtained from G adding a new vertex x and
connecting x to all the vertices in G. The associated input to Bval is formed by the influence game
Γ (G′) and the player x. Observe that the reduction can be computed in polynomial time.
Let X be a successful team in Γ (G′) such that x ∈ X . When X 6= V (G′) we know that X \ {x} must
be a vertex cover of G. Furthermore x ∈ Cx as X \ {x} is not winning in Γ (G′). When X = V (G′),
X \ {x} is winning in Γ (G′) and thus x /∈ Cx. As a consequence, we have that ηx(Γ ) coincides with
the number of vertex covers of G minus one. As computing the number of vertex covers of a graph is
#P-hard, we have that Bval is #P-hard.
According to [5] (Theorem 3.29, page 50), to prove that SSval is #P-hard, it is enough to show that
Bval is #P-hard and that influence games verify the property of being a reasonable representation. This
last condition is stated as follows. For a simple game Γ = (N,W), consider the game Γ ′ = (N ∪{x},W ′),
where x is a new player and W ′ = {S ∪ {x} | S ∈ W}. A representation of simple games is reasonable
if a representation of the game Γ ′ can be computed with only polynomial blow-up with respect to a
given representation of the game Γ . In the remaining of this proof we show that influence games are a
reasonable representation.
Let Γ = (G,w, f, q,N) be an influence game, and assume that G = (V,E) has n vertices and m
edges. Consider the influence graph (G′, w′, f ′) where
– G′ = (V ′, E′) and V ′ = V ∪ {x, y} ∪ {a1, . . . , a2n},
– E′ = E ∪ {(x, y)} ∪ {(v, y) | v ∈ V } ∪ {(y, ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n},
– w′(e) = w(e), for any e ∈ E, and w′(e) = 1, for any e ∈ E′ \ E, and
– f ′(v) = f(v), for any v ∈ V , f ′(x) = 1, f ′(y) = q + 1, and f ′(ai) = 1, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Finally, we consider the influence game Γ+ = (G′, w′, f ′, q′, N ′) where q′ = 2n and N ′ = N ∪ {x}.
From the previous construction, it follows that all the winning coalitions in Γ+ must include x.
Furthermore, X∪{x} is a winning coalition in Γ+ if and only if X is a winning coalition in Γ . Therefore,
Γ+ is a representation of Γ ′ and has polynomial size with respect to the size of Γ . So, we conclude that
influence games are a reasonable representation.
Now we consider another set of problems that reflect fundamental properties of simple games. The
input to the following problems is a game Γ .
IsProper: Determine whether Γ is proper, i.e., whether, for any X ∈ W , N \X ∈ L.
IsStrong: Determine whether Γ is strong, i.e., whether, for any X ∈ L, N \X ∈ W .
IsDecisive: Determine whether Γ is decisive, i.e., whether X ∈ W if and only if N \X ∈ L.
When a simple game Γ is given by (N,Wm), it is known that the IsProper problem can be decided
in polynomial time. Here we can check, for any X ∈ Wm, N\X /∈ W in polynomial time. Further, the
IsStrong problem is coNP-complete [46] and the IsDecisive problem can be solved in quasi-polynomial
time [23] but is not known to be polynomial time solvable. All these results were obtained in the context
of simple game theory [50,27].
The following problems consider properties of a player with respect to an influence game. Their input
is composed of a simple game Γ and player i.
IsDummy: Determine whether player i is a dummy player,
i.e., whether, for any team X ∈ W with i ∈ X , X \ {i} ∈ W .
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Fig. 8. Influence graph (G1, f1) of the game ∆1(G, k).
IsPasser: Determine whether player i is a passer,
i.e., whether, for any team X with i ∈ X , X ∈ W .
IsVetoer: Determine whether player i is a veto player,
i.e., whether, for any team X with i /∈ X , X ∈ L.
IsDictator: Determine whether player i is a dictator,
i.e., whether, X ∈ W if and only if i ∈ X .
IsCritical: Given, in addition, a team X including i, determine whether i is critical for X ,
i.e., X ∈ W and X \ {i} ∈ L.
AreSymmetric: Given, in addition, an agent j, determine whether players i and j are symmetric,
i.e., whether, for any team X , X ∪ {i} ∈ W if and only if X ∪ {j} ∈ W .
The following problems consider properties of a team of agents X with respect to an influence game.
Now the input is composed of a game Γ and a team X .
IsBlocking: Determine whether X is a blocking team, i.e., whether N \X ∈ L.
IsSwing: Determine whether X is a swing, i.e., whether X ∈ W but there is i ∈ X such that
X \ {i} ∈ L.
To analyze the complexity of the above problems we consider a new construction. Let G = (V,E) be
a graph where V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , em}, and let k be an integer (which will be useful to
consider a set cover of size k or less). Then the unweighted influence game ∆1(G, k) = (G1, f1, q1, N1) is
defined as follows, where Figure 8 shows the corresponding influence graph.
The graph G1 = (V1, E1) has V1 = {v1, . . . , vn, e1, . . . , em, x, y, z, s1, . . . , sα} where α = m + n + 4.
The edges in E1 are constructed as follows. We include the incidence graph of G: for any e = (vi, vj) ∈ E,
we add to E1 the edges (e, vi), (e, vj) and (e, y). For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we add the edge (vi, x). For any
1 ≤ j ≤ α, we add the edges (x, sj) and (y, sj). Finally, we add the edge (z, y). The labeling function f1
is defined as: f1(vi) = m + 2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; f1(ej) = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m; f1(sℓ) = 1, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ α; and f1(z) = 2,
f1(x) = k + 1, f1(y) = m+ 1. The quota is q1 = α and the set of players is N1 = {v1, . . . , vn, z}.
Observe that by construction the games Γ (G) and ∆1(G, k) can be obtained in polynomial time. As
an immediate consequence of the definition, we have that X is a successful team in ∆1(G, k) if and only
if either (|X ∩ V | ≥ k + 1) or z ∈ X and X \ z is a vertex cover in G.
Our next result settles the complexity of the problems which are coNP-complete.
Theorem 9. For unweighted influence games with polynomial number of vertices, the problems AreSym-
metric, IsDummy, IsProper, IsStrong and IsDecisive are coNP-complete.
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Fig. 9. Influence graph (G2, f2) used in the definition of the game ∆2(G, k).
Proof. Membership in coNP follows from the definitions. To get the hardness results, we provide reduc-
tions from the complement of the Vertex Cover problem and some other problems derived from it.
Let (G, k) be an input to Vertex Cover, as usual we assume that G has n vertices and m edges.
Let us start considering the IsDummy problem. Starting from G = (V,E) and k, we construct the
unweighted influence game ∆1(G, k) and the pair (∆1(G, k), z) which is an instance of the IsDummy
problem. If G has a vertex cover X with size k or less, by construction, we have that X ∪ {z} is a
successful team of ∆1(G, k). Furthermore, if X is a vertex cover of minimum size, we have that X ∪ {z}
is a minimal successful team. Therefore, z is not a dummy player in ∆1(G, k). If G does not have a
vertex cover with size k or less and X is a successful team containing z, it must hold that |X \ {z}| > k,
therefore X \ {z} is a successful team. In consequence z is a dummy player in ∆1(G, k). As the pair
(∆1(G, k), z) is computable in polynomial time, we have the desired result.
Let us consider now the AreSymmetric problem. Starting from G = (V,E) and k, we construct
the unweighted influence game ∆2(G, k) = (G2, f2, q2, N2) (see Figure 9). G2 is obtained from the graph
G1 appearing in the construction of ∆1(G, k) by adding two new vertices t and s and the edges (x, s),
(y, s) and (t, s). Recall that V (G1) = {v1, . . . , vn, e1, . . . , em, x, y, z, s1, . . . , sα}.The label function is the
following: f2(v) = f1(v), for v ∈ V (G2) ∩ V (G1); f2(s) = 4; f2(t) = 2. Finally, q2 = α + 1 = n+m+ 5
and N2 = {v1, . . . , vn, z, t}. Note that a description of G2 can be obtained in polynomial time as well
as a description of ∆2(G, k) given a description of (G, k). Let us show that the construction is indeed a
reduction.
When G has a vertex cover X of size k or less, by construction the team X ∪ {z} is successful in
∆2(G, k) while the team X ∪{t} is unsuccessful. Therefore z and t are not symmetric. When G does not
have a vertex cover X of size k or less, by construction, any successful team Y must contain a subset
with at least k + 1 vertices from {v1, . . . , vn}. Therefore both Y ∪ {z} and Y ∪ {t} are successful teams
in ∆2(G, k), i.e., vertices z and t are symmetric.
To prove hardness for the next two problems, IsProper and IsDecisive, we provide a reduction
from the following variation of the Vertex Cover problem:
Half vertex cover: Given an undirected graph with an odd number of vertices n.
Is there a vertex cover with size (n− 1)/2 or less?
We first show that the Half vertex cover problem is NP-complete. By definition the problem belongs
to NP. To prove hardness we show a reduction from the Vertex Cover problem. Given a graph G with
n vertices and an integer k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we construct a graph Gˆ as follows (see Figure 10). Gˆ has vertex
set Vˆ = V (G) ∪X ∪ Y ∪ {w}, where X has n− k − 1 vertices, Y has k + 1 vertices, and edge set
Eˆ = E ∪ {(x, x′) | x 6= x′ ∧ x, x′ ∈ X} ∪ {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } ∪ {(w, z) | z ∈ V ∪X ∪ Y }
By construction, Gˆ has 2n+ 1 vertices, so it can be constructed in polynomial time. Note that any
vertex cover S of Gˆ with minimum size has to contain w, all the vertices in X and no vertex from Y . The
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Fig. 11. Influence graph (G3, f3) of the game ∆3(G, k).
remaining of the cover, S ∩ V must be a minimum vertex cover of G. Therefore, G has a vertex cover of
size k or less if and only if Gˆ has a vertex cover of size n or less.
Let us provide a reduction from the Half vertex cover to the IsProper and the IsDecisive
problems. Let G be an instance of Half vertex cover with 2k + 1 vertices, for some value k ≥
1. Consider the unweighted influence game ∆1(G, (n − 1)/2) = (G1, f1, q1, N1). Recall that V (G′) =
{v1, . . . , vn, e1, . . . , em, x, y, z, s1, . . . , sα} where α = n+m+4, q1 = n+m+5, and N1 = {v1, . . . , vn, z}.
Let k = (n− 1)/2.
If G has a vertex cover X with |X | ≤ k, the team X ∪{z} is successful and, as n+1− |X ∪{z}| > k,
we have that N \ (X ∪ {z}) is also successful. Hence ∆1(G, k) is not proper. When all the vertex covers
of G have more than k vertices, any successful team Y of ∆1(G, k) verifies |Y ∩ {v1, . . . , vn}| > k, i.e.,
|Y ∩ {v1, . . . , vn}| ≥ k + 1. For a successful team Y , we have to consider two cases: z ∈ Y and z /∈ Y .
When z ∈ Y , N \ Y ⊆ {v1, . . . , vn} and |N \ Y | ≤ n − k − 1 = k. Thus, N \ Y is an unsuccessful
team. When z /∈ Y , |N \ (Y ∪ {z})| ≤ k and N \ Y is again an unsuccessful team. So, we conclude that
∆1(G, (n − 1)/2) is proper. As ∆1(G, (n − 1)/2) can be obtained in polynomial time, the IsProper
problem is coNP-hard.
Observe that when G is an instance of the Half vertex cover and all the vertex covers of G have
more than (n − 1)/2 vertices, the game ∆1(G, (n − 1)/2) is also decisive. When this condition is not
met, the game ∆1(G, (n − 1)/2) is not proper and thus it is not decisive. Thus, we conclude that the
IsDecisive problem is also coNP-hard.
To finish the proof we show hardness for the IsStrong problem. We provide a reduction from the
complement of the following problem.
Half independent set: Given an undirected graph with an even number of vertices n.
Is there an independent set with size n/2 or higher?
The Half independent set trivially belongs to NP. Hardness follows from a simple reduction from
the Half independent set. Starting from a graph G with an odd number of vertices we construct a
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new graph G′ by adding one new vertex connected to all the vertices in G. This construction guarantees
that G has a vertex cover of size (n − 1)/2 or less if and only if G′ has a vertex cover with size n/2 or
less. As the complement of a vertex cover is an independent set, we have that G has a vertex cover of
size (n− 1)/2 if and only if G′ has an independent set with size n/2 or higher.
Now we show that the complement of the Half independent set problem can be reduced to
the IsStrong problem. We associate to an input to Half independent set the game ∆3(G,n/2) =
(G3, f3, n+m+ 5, N3) where N3 = V ∪ {z} and (G3, f3) is the influence graph described in Figure 11.
Which is a variation of ∆1(G, k) using ideas similar to those in the reduction from the Set Packing
problem in Theorem 6.
When G has an independent set with size at least n/2, G also has an independent set X with
|X | = n/2. It is easy to see that both the teamX∪{z} and its complement are unsuccessful in∆3(G,n/2).
Therefore, ∆3(G,n/2) is not strong. Assume now that all the independent sets in G have less than n/2
vertices. Observe that, for a team X in ∆3(G,n/2) with |X ∩ V | < n/2, its complement has at least
n/2 + 1 elements in V and thus it is successful. When |X ∩ V | > n/2 the team is successful. Therefore
we have to consider only those teams with |X ∩ V | = n/2. In such a case, we know that neither X ∩ V
nor V \ (X ∩ V ) are independent sets. Then, by construction, one of the sets X or N \X must contain
z and is successful while its complement is unsuccessful. In consequence ∆3(G,n/2) is strong.
The complexity of the remaining problems is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For influence games, the problems IsPasser, IsVetoer, IsDictator, IsCritical, Is-
Blocking and IsSwing belong to P.
Proof. We provide characterizations of the properties in terms of the sizes of F (X) for adequate sets X .
Given an influence game Γ = (G,w, f, q,N), i ∈ N and X ⊆ N , we have.
– Player i is a passer if and only if |F ({i})| ≥ q.
– Player i is a vetoer if and only if |F (N \ {i})| < q.
– Player i is a dictator if and only if |F (N \ {i})| < q and |F ({i})| ≥ q.
– Player i is critical for team X if and only if |F (X)| ≥ q and |F (X \ {i})| < q.
– Team X is blocking if and only if |F (N \X)| < q.
– Team X is a swing if and only if |F (X)| ≥ q and there is i ∈ X for which |F (X \ {i}) < q.
Therefore, from Lemma 1, we get the claimed result.
Now we consider the complexity of the problems related to game isomorphism and equivalence. We
state here the definitions for influence games.
Definition 8. Let Γ = (G,w, f, q,N) and Γ ′ = (G′, w′, f ′, q′, N ′) be two influence games with the same
number of players. Γ and Γ ′ are isomorphic if and only if there exists a bijective function, ϕ : N → N ′,
such that |F (X)| ≥ q if and only if |F (ϕ(X))| ≥ q′. Moreover, when N = N ′ and ϕ is the identity
function, then we say that the two influence games are equivalent.
The associated problems have as input two influence games and are stated as follows.
Iso: Determine whether the two influence games are isomorphic.
Equiv: Determine whether the two influence games are equivalent.
Theorem 11. For unweighted influence games with polynomial number of vertices, the problem Equiv
is coNP-complete and the problem Iso is coNP-hard and belongs to Σp2 .
Proof. Membership to the corresponding complexity classes follows directly from the definition of the
problems. For the hardness part we provide a reduction from the complement of the Vertex Cover
problem. LetG be a graph and consider the influence game Γ1 = ∆1(G, k) as defined before (see Figure 8).
Recall that the set of players is N1 = {v1, . . . , vn, z}. To define the second influence game Γ2 we consider
the weighted game with set of players N1 and quota q = k + 1. The weights of the players are the
following: w(vi) = 1, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and w(z) = 0. A representation of Γ2 as an unweighted influence
game can be obtained in polynomial time using the construction of Theorem 3. Our reduction associates
to an input to vertex cover (G, k) the pair of influence games (Γ1, Γ2). Observe that Γ1 is equivalent
(isomorphic) to Γ2 if and only if G does not have a vertex cover of size k or less.
We have been unable to provide a complete classification for the Iso problem. It remains open to
show whether the problem is Σp2 -hard or not.
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5 Unweighted Influence Games on Undirected Graphs
In this section we analyze the complexity of the proposed problems on some particular subfamilies of
unweighted influence games defined on undirected graphs.
5.1 Maximum Influence
Here we analyze first the case with maximum influence and maximum spread, that is games of the form
Γ = (G, f, |V |, V ) where f(v) = dG(v), or, as we said before, the game Γ = Γ (G), for some graph G.
When the graph G is disconnected with connected components C1, . . . , Ck, the associated game Γ (G)
can be analyzed from the Γ (C1), . . . , Γ (Ck). Observe that, due to maximum spread, a successful team
must influence all the vertices in the graph. Therefore, the members of a successful team in a connected
component must influence all the vertices in their component. So, a team X is successful in Γ (G) if and
only if, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the team X ∩ V (Ci) is successful in Γ (Ci). We analyze first the case in which
G is connected.
Theorem 12. In an unweighted influence game Γ with maximum influence and maximum spread on a
connected graph G the following properties hold.
– Γ is proper if and only if G is not bipartite.
– Γ is strong if and only if G is either a star or a triangle.
– Γ is decisive if and only if G is a triangle.
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that the successful teams of Γ = Γ (G) coincide with the vertex covers
of G. We also recall that the complement of a vertex cover is an independent set.
If G = (V,E) is bipartite, let (V1, V2) be a partition of V so that V1 and V2 are independent sets.
In such a case, both V1 and V2 = N \ V1 are successful teams in Γ . Therefore, Γ is not proper. For the
opposite direction, if Γ is not proper, then the game admits two disjoint successful team, i.e, two disjoint
vertex covers of G, and hence each of them must be an independent set. Thus the graph G is bipartite.
Now we prove that Γ is not strong if and only if G has at least two non-incident edges. Observe that
a graph where all edges are incident is either a triangle or a star. If G has at least two non-incident edges
e1 = (u1, v1) and e2 = (u2, v2), {u1, v1} and N \ {u1, v1} are both unsuccessful teams, therefore Γ is not
strong. When the game is not strong, there is a team X such that both X and N \X are unsuccessful.
For this to happen it must be that there is an edge uncovered by X and another edge uncovered by
N \X . Thus G must have two non-incident edges.
Finally, it is well known that non-bipartite graphs has at least one odd cycle, so the only non-bipartite
graph with all pair of edges incidents (proper and strong) is a triangle (decisive).
When the graph is disconnected, a successful team Xi in the game Γ (Ci) can be completed to a
winning coalition in Γ . Observe that, if X i = V (Ci) \Xi, the set V \Xi is successful in Γ and contains
Xi. For an unsuccessful team Xi in Γ (Ci) both Xi and V \ Xi are unsuccessful in Γ . Therefore, the
previous result can be extended to disconnected graphs by requesting the conditions to hold in all the
connected components of the given graph.
Corollary 1. In an unweighted influence game Γ with maximum influence and maximum spread on a
graph G the following properties hold.
– Γ is proper if and only if all the connected components of G are not bipartite.
– Γ is strong if and only if all the connected components of G are either a star or a triangle.
– Γ is decisive if and only if all the connected components of G are triangles.
Furthermore, the problems IsProper, IsStrong and IsDecisive belong to P for unweighted influence
games with maximum influence and maximum spread.
In regard to the complexity of the two main game measures we have the following result.
Theorem 13. For unweighted influence games with maximum influence and maximum spread on a con-
nected graph G, computing Length is NP-hard. Computing Width of Γ (G) can be done in polynomial
time even when G is disconnected.
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Proof. As before we use the fact that Γ (G) can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, from
Lemma 3, Length(Γ (G)) is the minimum size of a vertex cover of G. Therefore Length is NP-hard.
We prove that Width can be computed in polynomial time by a case analysis. If G is just an isolated
vertex or just one edge, the empty set is the unique unsuccessful team, thus Width(Γ ) = 0. Otherwise,
either G has no edges or has at least one edge and an additional vertex. In the first case, the graph is
an independent set with at least two vertices. Assume that u ∈ V , then V \ {u} is unsuccessful and we
conclude that Width(Γ ) = n− 1.
In the second case G has at least one edge e = (u, v) and V \ {u, v} is non-empty. We have again two
cases, either G has an isolated vertex u or all the connected components of G have at least one edge.
When u is an isolated vertex the team V \ {u} is unsuccessful, therefore Width(Γ ) = n − 1. When all
the connected components of G have at least one edge, any team with n− 1 nodes is a vertex cover, thus
Width(Γ ) < n− 1. Observe that the set V \ {u, v} is not empty and, furthermore it does not cover the
edge e, thus we have an unssuccesful team with n− 2 vertices. Thus, in this case Width(Γ ) = n− 2.
As the classification can be checked trivially in polynomial time we get the claimed result.
For the case of maximum influence but not maximum spread, that is influence games of the form
(G, f, q, V ) where f(v) = dG(v) and q < n, the game cannot be directly analyzed from the games on the
connected components, as the total quota can be fulfilled in different ways by the agents influenced in
each component. Nevertheless, as the influence is maximum, any set of vertices X can influence another
vertex u only when all the neighbors of u are included in X , alternatively when u becomes an isolated
vertex after removing X . This leads to the following characterization of the successful teams.
Lemma 4. In an unweighted influence game with maximum influence Γ = (G, dG, q, V ) where G has
no isolated vertices, X ⊆ V is a successful team if and only if removing X from G leaves at least q− |X |
isolated vertices.
This characterization gives rise to the following problem:
AreIsolated: Given a graph G = (V,E) and q, k ∈ N.
Is there S ⊆ V such that |S| ≤ k and removing S from G
there are at least q − k isolated vertices?
Observe that for q = n we have that the solution S in the previous problem must be a vertex cover,
and thus the AreIsolated problem is NP-hard.
Theorem 14. For influence games Γ with maximum influence, Length is NP-hard and Width belongs
to P.
Proof. The hardness result follows from the previous observation. Observe that computing the minimum
size of a solution to the AreIsolated problem is equivalent to compute the Length of the game
Γ = (G, dG, q, V ) and thus the later problem is NP-hard.
When computing the Width of Γ = (G, dG, q, V ) we want to maximize the size of the unsuccessful
teams. Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to analyze only unsuccessful teams X for which F (X) = X .
We have that X is an unsuccessful team with F (X) = X if and only if |X | < q and every non isolated
vertex in V \X remains non isolated in G[V \X ] (the subgraph induced by N \X).
We consider first the case in which G has no isolated vertices. We first solve the problem of deciding
whether, for a given α, it is possible to discard α nodes from G without leaving isolated vertices. For
doing so we sort the sizes of the connected components of G in increasing order of size. As G has no
isolated vertices all the connected components have at least two vertices. Assume that G has k connected
components C1, . . . , Ck with sizes 2 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . . ≤ wk.
When wk = 2, all the connected components have exactly two vertices. Therefore, if α is even and
at most n, we can discard the α vertices in the first α/2 components, without leaving isolated vertices.
Otherwise, the removal of any set of size α will leave at least one isolated vertex.
When wk > 2. We compute the first value j for which
∑j
i=1 wi ≤ α but
∑j+1
i=1 wi > α. Let β =∑j
i=1 wi. Let Sj be the set of vertices in the first j-components. If β = α, Sj can be removed without
leaving isolated vertices. When β < α we have two cases:
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(1) wj+1 > α− β + 1. Let C ⊂ Cj+1 be a set with wj+1 − (α− β) vertices such that G[C] is connected.
The vertices in Sj together with the α− β vertices of Cj+1 not in C can be removed without leaving
any isolated vertex.
(2) wj+1 ≤ α − β + 1. By construction, α < β + wj+1, thus wj+1 = α − β + 1. If j + 1 < k, removing
the vertices in Sj together with α− β − 1 vertices from the j + 1-th component (as in case (1)) and
one additional vertex from the k-th component leaves no isolated vertices. If j + 1 = k, the removal
of any set of size α will leave at least one isolated vertex.
The previous characterization can be decided in polynomial time for any value of α. By performing
the test for α = q − 1, q − 2, . . . , 1 we can compute in polynomial time the maximum value of α (αmax)
for which α nodes can be discarded without leaving isolated vertices. As the Width of the game is just
αmax we get the desired result for graphs without isolated vertices.
When G has n0 isolated vertices, we consider the graph G
′ obtained from G by removing all the
isolated vertices. Note that for a team X with X = F (X) and any set Y of isolated vertices we have that
F (X ∪Y ) = X ∪Y , thus Width(Γ ) = min{Width(Γ ′)+n0, q−1}. Therefore Width can be computed
in polynomial time.
5.2 Minimum Influence
Let be Γ = (G, 1V , q, N) where 1V (v) = 1 for any v ∈ V . Observe that if G is connected, the game has a
trivial structure as any non-empty vertex subset of N is a successful team. For the disconnected case we
can analyze the game considering an instance of the Knapsack problem. Assume that G has k connected
components, C1, . . . , Ck. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the connected components of G
have non-empty intersection with N . For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let wi = |V (Ci)| and ni = |V (Ci) ∩N |.
Lemma 5. If a successful team X is minimal then it has at most one node in each connected component.
Minimal successful teams are in a many-to-one correspondence with the minimal winning coalitions of
the weighted game [q;w1, . . . , wk].
Moreover, we have the following result.
Theorem 15. For unweighted influence games with minimum influence, the problems Length, Width,
IsProper, IsStrong and IsDecisive belong to P.
Proof. Let Γ = (G, 1V , q, N) be an unweighted influence game with minimum influence.
First we prove that Length can be computed in polynomial time. Assume that the connected com-
ponents of G are sorted in such a way that w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wk. To minimize the size of a winning coalition
we consider only those coalitions with at most one player in a connected component. Observe that, the
Length(Γ ) is the minimum j for which
∑j
i=1 wi ≥ q but
∑j−1
i=1 wi < q. Of course this value can be
computed in polynomial time.
For computing Width observe that an unsuccessful team of maximum size can be obtained by
computing a selection S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} of connected components in such a way that
∑
i∈S wi < q and∑
i∈S ni is maximized. Computing such selection is equivalent to solving a Knapsack problem on a
set of k items, item i having weight wi and value ni, and setting the knapsack capacity to q. As the
Knapsack problem can be solved in pseudo polynomial time and, in our case, all the weights and values
are at most n, we conclude that Width can be computed in polynomial time.
Now we prove that the IsStrong problem belongs to P. Observe that in order to minimize the
influence of the complementary of a team X it is enough to consider only those teams X that contain
all or none of the players in a connected component. Let wN =
∑k
i=1 wi, and let αmax be the maximum
α ∈ {0, . . . , q− 1} for which there is a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} with
∑
i∈S wi = α. Note that α can be zero and
thus S can be the empty set. Observe that Γ is strong if and only if wN − αmax ≥ q. The value αmax
can be computed by solving several instances of the Knapsack problem. As the weights are at most n,
the value can be obtained in polynomial time.
Now we prove that the IsProper problem can be solved in polynomial time. To check whether
the game is not proper it is enough to show that there is a winning coalition whose complement is
also winning. For doing so we separate the connected components in two sets: those containing one
player and those containing more that one player. Let A = {i | ni = 1} and B = {i | ni > 1}. Let
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Fig. 12. The simple game whose set of players N = {1, . . . , n} admits a partition N1, . . . , Nm in such a way
that W = {S ⊆ N ; ∃Ni with Ni ⊆ S} has exponential dimension, n1 · . . . · nm−1 [28], but this game admits a
polynomial unweighted influence graph (G, f) with respect to n for the corresponding unweighted influence game
(G, f, n+ 1, N).
NA = ∪i∈A(N∩V (Ci)) and NB = N \NA. Let wA =
∑
i∈A wi and wB = wN−wA. As all the components
in B have at least two vertices, we can find a set X ⊆ NB such that |F (X)| = |F (NB \X)| = wB. Thus
if wB ≥ q the game is not proper. When wB < q the game is proper if and only if the influence game
Γ ′ played on the graph formed by the connected components belonging to A and quota q′ = q − wB is
proper. Observe that Γ ′ is equivalent to the weighted game with a player for each component in i ∈ A
with associated weight wi and quota q
′.
Let αmin be the minimum α ∈ {q′, . . . , wA} for which there is a set S ⊆ A with
∑
i∈S wi = α.
Observe that Γ ′ is proper if and only if wA − αmin < q′. The value αmin can be computed by solving
several instances of the Knapsack problem having item weights polynomial in n. Therefore, αmin can
be computed in polynomial time and the claim follows.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered an influence spread model in social networks as a mechanism for
emergence of cooperation. Our model is based on the linear threshold model for influence spread. In
such a context we use parameters and properties derived from voting systems (simple games) to analyze
the properties of the system. This point of view has given rise to the introduction of a new family of
simple games, called influence games. We have shown that influence games are enough expressive to
represent the complete family of simple games. Interestingly enough we have shown that representations,
as influence games, of the union or intersection of two influence games can be computed in polynomial
time. We have also shown that influence games in which the number of agents is polynomial in the
number of players is a proper subset of simple games.
The remaining contribution of this paper concerns the computational complexity of problems related
to several parameters and properties. Our results are summarized in Table 1. As a side result we have
been able to show that computing the width of a game given by the set of winning or minimal winning
coalitions can be computed in polynomial time, which was posted as an open problem in [5]. Finally, we
have analyzed two extreme cases for the required level of influence, maximum and minimum, showing
that the computational complexity of some of the considered problems changes, becoming in general
more tractable. In particular we have shown a graph characterization of the proper and strong properties
in terms of graph properties for influence graphs with maximum influence and maximum spread.
We have studied the isomorphism and equivalence problems for influence games. It remains open to
show whether the Iso problem is or not Σp2 -complete. The equivalence problem has been studied for
weighted and multiple weighted game [20] (see Table 1). To the best of our knowledge, the complexity
of the Iso problem remains open for weighted games as well as for any of the families of simple games
defined by boolean combinations of weighted games considered in this paper.
There are many open lines for future research, here we mention a few. On the general topic of
spreading influence, it will be interesting to analyze the properties of the influence games defined through
other influence spread mechanisms, in particular for randomized models like the independent cascade
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model [39]. Besides the extreme situations previously mentioned, there are many other natural rules to
study, such as the majority rule, when individuals are convinced when a majority of their neighbors are.
Also, analyzing the properties of particular types of graphs arising in social networks or other type of
organizations in which influence spread can take part in the decision process.
Simple games are defined by monotonic families that can be defined succinctly by monotonic functions.
Therefore, there are several circuit or graph based formalisms that can be used to represent simple games.
Among them the binary decision diagrams (BDDs) has been used as an alternative representation of
simple games [11]. This succinct form of representation is most commonly used to represent Boolean
functions [1]. BDDs have been used to study several properties of simple games, regular games and
weighted games [8]. However, except for some results regarding the computation of power indices, for
subfamilies of simple games [11], the complexity of most of the problems studied in this paper remain as
an open problem.
Lastly, even though we have shown that all games with polynomial dimension or polynomial codi-
mension can be represented as weighted influence games in polynomial time (i.e., they admit weighted
influence graphs with polynomial number of agents), a fundamental open question is determining which
simple games can be represented as an (unweighted) influence game with polynomial number of agents.
In particular it remains open to know whether there are games with exponential dimension that also
require an exponential number of players in any representation as influence games. In this line, we know
that the simple game with exponential dimension with respect to the players of Section 2 in [28] can be
represented by a unweighted influence game in polynomial time with respect to the number of players
(see Figure 12). Another candidate is the simple game with exponential dimension of Theorem 8 in [20]
for which we have been unable to show whether it can be represented by a (unweighted) influence game
with polynomial number of agents or not.
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